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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to discover the optimal amount of salary
dispersion for an NBA team and the affect that dispersion has on team wins and
revenue. The optimal amount of salary dispersion could be different for teams that
want to maximize wins and teams that want to maximize revenue. For the purpose
of this study, five different measures of salary dispersion are utilized to most
effectively understand the effects. Empirical models are constructed and OLS
regressions employed using cross-sectional data from the 2006-07 NBA season
through the 2010-11 season to understand the relationship. The empirical evidence
supports the idea that the larger the salary dispersion the greater the number of wins
achieved. The evidence also implies that the amount of dispersion does not
significantly affect the amount of revenue generated by a team. According to this
study, a win maximizing team should attempt to hire as many superstars as possible
given the NBA’s salary constraints.

I.

Introduction

Teams in the National Basketball Association (NBA) face important salary allocation
decisions. NBA players provide different value to their respective team and therefore are worth
different amounts of money. General managers have to determine how to allocate the total
salary given to their signed players. An important research question to consider is: What is the
best way to allocate salary amongst an NBA team? The term “best” in this situation can be
interpreted in different ways. ”Best” can be viewed as a salary distribution that maximizes wins.
Wins are obviously important to both fans and management. “Best” can also be viewed as a
salary distribution that maximizes revenue as each team is attempting to make money.
There are many reasons that this research is important. Understanding the results of salary
distribution could play a significant role in the shaping of the league. Also, greater knowledge of
how salary distribution affects wins and revenues could be helpful to general managers as they
construct their teams more appropriately.
With general managers’ knowledge of effective team construction increasing, the
competitive balance of the NBA might improve. The biggest problem any sports league faces is
competitive imbalance. A large amount of imbalance can lead to a contraction in the number of
teams, or even the disbanding of the entire league (Rosen et al, 2000). The NBA has the biggest
competitive imbalance problem of any of the four major sports leagues when it comes to number
of wins and amount of revenue generated. At the end of the 2010-11 NBA season, two teams,
the Boston Celtics and Los Angeles Lakers, have won a combined 33 NBA Championships in
the NBA’s 65 years. In addition, differences across teams in revenue generation are enormous.
Within the last five years, there has been up to a 254% difference between the top and bottom
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teams in total revenue. The competitive imbalance problem deals with a problem at the league
level, whereas the research question at hand deals with the team level disparity. They are
connected, however, because if general managers knew how salary dispersion on a team level
affects wins and revenues, they could use this knowledge to construct more competitive teams.
This would increase the health of the league and everyone involved with the NBA would reap
the benefits.
In addition to these facts on the importance of this topic in the NBA, this research is feasible
because of the availability of relevant data. Production and productivity outcomes are more
easily measured in sports compared to other business firms. Basketball players’ productivity is
much more easily measured than workers in other firms because of the statistics that are
compiled with the sport.
This study aims to determine the optimal amounts of salary dispersion to maximize wins and
maximize revenue. Based on economic theory provided in the following section, I hypothesize
that the optimal amount of salary dispersion will be different for teams that have a goal of
maximizing wins and teams that have a goal of maximizing revenue. Labor demand theory,
human capital theory, and superstar theory all play a role in the following section. Based on these
economic theories, I hypothesize that the greater the dispersion the greater the number of wins
achieved. I also hypothesize that the greater the dispersion the greater the amount of revenue
generated.
II.

Theory and Literature Review
While a large amount of literature is published on the effects of wage disparities within

firms, there is little on the effects of salary dispersion in the NBA. Most literature on salary
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dispersion in sports deals with the effect of salary dispersion on the number of wins and does not
consider revenue. The literature that deals with wins and salary dispersion is relatively new and
has mostly appeared after the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the NBA owners
and players’ union was developed at the start of the 1995 season (Berri et al, 2004). This was the
first time in NBA history where the salary dispersion within teams really exploded. The
“middle-class” of the NBA was basically lost and teams had a combination of very high salaried
players and relatively low salaried players (Berri et al, 2004). Many teams, as a result of the
terms of the new CBA, allocated a substantial amount of team payroll to a few stars and then
completed their roster with players offered the NBA minimum wage or close to it.
Berri and Jewell (2004) in addition to Katayama and Nuch (2011) saw this rapid change
in distribution of salaries as a chance for a natural experiment to understand how changes in
disparity impact team/firm performance. Each study defined the dispersion variable differently,
but came to the same conclusions. Both studies found the amount of salary dispersion within a
team to have no significant effect on team performance. The authors say that, for this industry at
least, the idea of tournament theory, which states that pay inequality results in higher worker
productivity, and pay compression school of thought, which states that wage equality will
enhance cooperation and therefore performance, are both inapplicable (Berri et al, 2004). The
datasets used, however, were admittedly somewhat small and both Berri and Katayama believe
there could be a significant effect if the sample size was larger (Katayama et al, 2011). Another
similarity of these authors was their conclusion that salary dispersion might not affect team
performance because the lower salaried players will perform to their best abilities to maximize
the amount of salary they can obtain on their next contract.
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Stefan Kesenne (2007) discusses the multiple objectives of professional sports teams in
The Economic Theory of Professional Team Sports. He acknowledges that professional sports
organizations are businesses that attempt to maximize revenue and profit, but at the same time
many teams are focused on maximizing wins. Studies have been inconclusive in accepting or
rejecting the profit or win maximization goals. Kesenne provides a simple diagram that leads to
his underlying hypothesis that revenue maximizing teams and win maximizing teams will have a
differing amount of salary dispersion. Figure 1 shows the different amount of talent demand
levels depending on team goals. The number of talents, or superstars, is represented on the
horizontal axis and total revenue and cost is represented on the vertical axis. The variables t1, t2,
etcetera, on the horizontal axis do not specifically mean one superstar, two superstars, and so
forth. They represent different possible number of talents on a team, but not incremental
increases in talents. The farther to the right on the horizontal axis, the higher the total number of
talents on a team. Total cost (C) increases as the number of talents increases, but the revenue
curve (R) is concave. According to Kesenne, this is a result of revenue increasing with the team
becoming more successful, but then decreasing if the team becomes too good and public interest
fades because of lack of uncertainty of outcomes. A revenue maximizing team will hire at the t2
amount of talents on this graph, where the revenue curve is at its highest point. Under the
assumption that the most successful teams have more talents, a win maximizing team would
want to hire as many talents as financially possible. Therefore, a win maximizing team will hire
t4 amount of talents on this graph, where they can maximize the amount of talents without losing
any money (Kesenne, 2007). This analysis makes clear that the revenue maximization point and
win maximization point requires a different amount of talents and therefore a differing amount of
salary dispersion.
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Figure 1: Kesenne's Theory of Sports Teams

The effect of superstars on revenue has also been extensively studied, especially by
Sherwin Rosen (1981) and Walter Oi (2008). Rosen discusses that the settings in which
superstars are found share two common elements. The first is a close connection between
personal reward and the size of a person’s own market, and the second is a strong tendency for
market size and reward to be skewed toward the most talented people in a specific activity. Oi
believes that superstars’ gigantic income and rare talents is what attracts attention. They both
acknowledge that superstars are of interest to fans and, therefore, create attention. In most
circumstances superstars are considered entertaining, and it is the search for entertainment,
admiration, and a desire to understand how they are as good as they are that creates revenue for
their firm.
Jerry Hausman and Gregory Leonard (1997) studied the effect that NBA superstars had
on both team and league revenue during a number of seasons in the 1990’s. Some of the avenues
that superstars help produce revenues are through increases in television ratings, game
attendance, and sport paraphernalia sales. They found that a superstar positively impacts both
his team’s total revenue and other teams’ revenue (Hausman et al, 1997). This means that small
market teams would attempt to free-ride off large market teams. According to Hausman, a
5

suggestion to fix this free rider benefit is to impose a salary cap. A salary cap, however, could
over correct the superstar externality. The NBA has tried to correct this problem by instituting a
soft salary cap (Coon, 2011). This means that there are a few exceptions to the salary cap rule
and teams are able to have a payroll that exceeds the salary cap, but are fined when payrolls
exceed a certain luxury tax level. The luxury tax level is determined by a complicated formula,
but is typically in the range of $12-13 million above the salary cap.
Salary dispersion and the effect it has on teams can also be explained within the
framework of demand theory. Marginal revenue product (MRP) is the demand for labor curve.
Human capital is an important concept in relation to the MRP curve because it is a major
determinant of the marginal productivity of workers. Human capital refers to the productive
capabilities of human beings as income generating components in the economy (Rosen, 2008).
According to human capital theory, the higher the productivity that is obtained through
investments in education and training, the higher amount of income a person should achieve.
Also, human capital theory suggests that the returns to investments in education and training are
directly related to the individual’s innate ability and physical endowments. Therefore, the higher
the basketball player’s skill, the higher the amount of income he should generate and the higher
his MRP.
According to Oi (2008), small differences in talent can be associated with large
differences in income, especially when the market size is big, which is definitely the case with
the NBA. This idea is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 3 shows that with increased training
all players’ marginal product increases, but superstars’ marginal product increases by a larger
amount. The same thing occurs in Figure 2 with marginal revenue product increasing with
training, but superstars’ marginal revenue product increases by an even greater amount than it
6

did with marginal product in comparison to the normal players. This large difference in MRP
allows superstars to earn a high income compared to normal players and could cause great salary
dispersion within a team.
Each team, in essence, constructs its own demand curve and has a different curve than
each other team (Rosen et al, 2000). This is in part because talent is distributed differently
across teams. With the knowledge of the MRP of players and the presence of a salary cap,
demand curves can be understood. With a larger number of high skilled players, a large amount
of the team’s total salary, which is restricted by the salary cap and luxury tax level, is devoted to
a few players. Therefore, the demand curve would be very steep and inelastic. Teams with more
balanced salary dispersion will have a flatter more elastic demand curve (Rosen et al, 2000).
This idea is represented in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 represents a MRP curve of a team that
employs a few superstars and the rest below average players, therefore creating an uneven
distribution of talent. The superstars, as a result of their high skill level, receive larger salaries.
Given the salary constraints a team faces, the rest of the team is filled with below average skill
level players who receive much smaller salaries. This uneven distribution of talent, therefore,
7

creates a large amount of salary dispersion and an inelastic MRP curve. Figure 5 represents a
MRP curve for a team with players of similar abilities. Certain players would still make more
than others, but the overall salary dispersion for the team would be much less. This more
balanced distribution of talent, therefore, creates little salary dispersion and an elastic MRP curve.
Free agency in the NBA allows players to negotiate their contracts. Teams have to bid
for players and players can decide if they believe the offer is fair. The potential producer surplus
obtained by the team that signs the player is squeezed out by the player as a result of the ability
to negotiate. At the extreme, players receive their personal MRP and teams receive no producer
surplus. An interesting part to this is that teams offer salaries to players at what they believe the
player’s future MRP will be. The decision process of whom to sign and for what price enables
each team to create its own unique demand curve (Rosen et al, 2000).

Kesenne’s theory of professional sports teams along with demand for labor theory sets
the stage for the remainder of this research study. When looking into the effects of salary
distribution amongst NBA teams, both of these theories are relevant. They suggest that salary
distribution can have a significant effect on the distribution of talent across teams. This will
cause variation in MP schedules and MRP curves in asymmetric ways. Therefore, salary
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distribution can affect both wins and revenues, but not necessarily in the same way. The
remainder of the paper will analyze the actual effects of salary distribution on wins and revenues
in the NBA.
III.

Data
Two different models each employing cross-sectional data are used to determine the

effect of salary distribution on wins and revenues for NBA teams. This section discusses the
data and the next section defines the variables in terms of definition, importance, and expected
effect.
In the first model, the Wins Model, the number of wins a team achieves during the
regular season is the dependent variable. It includes regular season wins, and not playoff wins,
because every team participates in exactly 82 regular season games whereas not every team
makes the playoffs. Using only regular season wins allows the study to be more consistent and
accurate. This data is compiled from the NBA’s website ("NBA.com"). In the second model,
the Revenue Model, the team’s total revenue of each season is the dependent variable. Forbes
publishes valuations and other reported money figures, such as revenue, of sports teams every
year (The Business of Basketball, 2011). The data for this study are from the 2006-07 to 20102011 seasons.
Total television market size in each NBA team’s metropolitan area needs to be accounted
for as that could play a role in a team’s revenue and wins. This data is reported by Nielson
Ratings, which is the most credible source when it comes to television monitoring (“Local
Television Market Universe Estimates"). One limitation to the Nielson Ratings, however, is that
it only reports figures for U.S. cities. The NBA is a multinational league with one team being
9

located in Toronto, Canada. The Bureau of Broadcast Measurement (BBM) is Canada’s
equivalent of the United State’s Nielson Ratings. The only year of data reported, during the
range of this study, for Toronto’s television market size was for the 2008-09 year. The other
four years of television market size data for Toronto are estimations based on Toronto’s
population.
Another piece of data that is pertinent to this study is the luxury tax level in the NBA for
each of the seasons. These figures are taken from the NBA’s website ("NBA.com").
Finally, the last data that are needed are total team salaries, to see if each given team is
above or below the luxury tax level, and a breakdown of team salaries by player in order to
analyze the amount of wage dispersion for each given team. This data is reported by USAToday,
which is a very reliable source for this type of data. Despite the reliability, there was a problem
with some of the information retrieved from this source ("National Basketball Association
Salaries"). When analyzing the salary data of the 2009-10 Houston Rockets, it was evident that
the database double counted one player. Yao Ming, a player on the Houston Rockets, was
included twice and this was corrected by removing the duplicate observation. Another
shortcoming from this source was that it did not include the 2006-07 and 2007-08 Seattle
Supersonics in its database as a result of their relocation to Oklahoma City. The salary figures
for the two years of data in this study where Seattle did have an NBA team comes from the
NBA’s website ("NBA.com").
IV.

Empirical Model
The empirical model section proceeds in three subsections. First, the dependent variables

for each model are discussed. Then, the different definitions of wage dispersion that are used in
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this study are discussed in more detail. And lastly, the other explanatory variables that are
needed as control variables in the regression model are discussed.
A. Dependent Variables
In this study, OLS regressions will be used to analyze the effect salary dispersion has on
team performance and revenue. The dependent variable changes from the Wins Model to the
Revenue Model. In the Wins Model, number of wins a team achieved during the regular season
will be the dependent variable, and in the Revenue Model the total revenue generated by a team
will be the dependent variable.
B. Salary Dispersion Measures
To better understand the relationship between salary dispersion in terms of team
performance and team revenue, multiple measures of dispersion are utilized. Salary dispersion
can be defined in a variety of ways, and this study investigates five different measures. Table 1
provides a short explanation and descriptive statistics about each dispersion variable and the
other explanatory variables that are described in the next subsection. Each measure of dispersion
used takes 12 players into account for each team because it is a requirement in the NBA that each
team has at least 12 signed players at any given time. There are many more players that are
signed to teams throughout a season, but they normally are signed to 10-day or 1-month
contracts and, therefore, would be outliers in this study. Each measure of dispersion is predicted
to have a positive effect on wins as well as on revenue.
The first measure of dispersion is each teams’ Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient
measures the inequality among values of a frequency distribution. The possible values of the
coefficient range from zero to one,
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Table 1: Explanation and Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable

Definition

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

St. Dev.

Wins

Number of Regular Season Wins per NBA
Team

12

67

41.00

12.89

Revenue

Total Revenue of NBA Team

$81,000,000

$226,000,000

$124,350,000

$31,594,769

Gini Coefficient of NBA Team

0.15223

0.60316

0.40930

0.08219

Standard Deviation

Stnd. Dev. of NBA Team's Salaries

1,216,443.42

8,595,963.05

4,538,701.43

1,309,843.75

Top Player as % of
Total Team Salary

Top Player's Salary as a Percentage of Total
Team Salary

11.76%

35.31%

23.46%

4.49%

Top 2 Players as % of
Total Team Salary

Top 2 Players' Salary as a Percentage of
Total Team Salary

23.48%

65.13%

40.57%

6.58%

Top 3 Players as % of
Total Team Salary

Top 3 Players' Salary as a Percentage of
Total Team Salary

34.40%

78.29%

54.05%

7.89%

Gini Coefficient2

Gini Coefficient of NBA Team Squared

0.02317

0.36380

0.17414

0.06486

Standard Deviation2

Stnd. Dev. of NBA Team's Salaries Squared

1.48E+12

7.39E+13

2.23E+13

1.24E+13

Top Player as % of
Total Team Salary2

Top Player's Salary as a Percentage of Total
Team Salary Squared

1.38%

12.47%

5.70%

2.12%

Top 2 Players as % of
Total Team Salary2

Top 2 Players' Salary as a Percentage of
Total Team Salary Squared

5.52%

42.42%

16.89%

5.42%

Top 3 Players as % of
Total Team Salary2

Top 3 Players' Salary as a Percentage of
Total Team Salary Squared

1.18%

61.29%

29.83%

8.78%

TVMarketSize

Number of Homes with TV's in Metro Area
of Each NBA Team's Home City

566,960.00

7,515,330.00

2,350,181.73

1,822,547.28

LuxuryTaxAbove

A Team With Total Salary That is Above the
Luxury Tax Level

0

1

0.39

0.49

LuxuryTaxBelow

A Team With Total Salary That is Below the
Luxury Tax Level

0

1

0.60

0.49

Fixed Effect 06-07

Team Competing in the 2006-07 Season

0

1

0.20

0.40

Fixed Effect 07-08

Team Competing in the 2007-08 Season

0

1

0.20

0.40

Fixed Effect 08-09

Team Competing in the 2008-09 Season

0

1

0.20

0.40

Fixed Effect 09-10

Team Competing in the 2009-10 Season

0

1

0.20

0.40

Fixed Effect 10-11

Team Competing in the 2010-11 Season

0

1

0.20

0.40

Dependent Variables
Model A

Model B

Explanatory Variables
Models A & B
Gini Coefficient
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with zero being perfect equality and one being perfect inequality. Normally the coefficient is
applied to measure the distribution of income in a country or region. In this case, the measure is
used to determine income dispersion within NBA teams. This measure of dispersion is different
from those commonly used to test the effect of salary dispersion on performance and revenue.
However, the Gini coefficient, while being a good overall indicator of the dispersion that exists
on a team, does not explicitly address the affect of superstars’ salaries.
In order to calculate each team’s Gini coefficient, a Lorenz Curve is constructed for each
team. The Lorenz Curve is a graphical representation that shows the degree of inequality that
exists in the distributions of two variables (Byrnes, 2012). The two variables in this case are the
population of each basketball team (12 players) and the amount of total salary. Figure 6 presents
a typical Lorenz Curve and gives insight into how the Gini coefficient for each team is calculated.
The number of players on a team is represented on the horizontal axis from one to 12. Player
one is the player on the team that is paid the lowest amount of salary, while player 12 is the
player on the team that is paid the highest amount of salary. The cumulative percent of salary
paid by the team is represented by the vertical axis. This creates an upward rising curve from
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player one to player 12. The perfect distribution line in Figure 6 represents perfect equality of
income. As a result of no teams having perfectly equal distribution of salaries, no team’s
distribution follows the perfect distribution line. The Lorenz Curve represented in Figure 6 is
more similar to that of a typical NBA team. The Gini coefficient is calculated by dividing the
area in between the perfect distribution line and Lorenz Curve by the total area under the perfect
distribution line. In terms of Figure 6, the Gini coefficient is the highlighted area divided by the
entire triangle that is created from the 45 degree perfect distribution line. This method of
calculating the Gini coefficient is applied to each team in this study to determine each team’s
respective Gini coefficient for each season.
The second measure of dispersion that is used is the standard deviation of each team’s
player salaries. This, like the Gini coefficient, is a representative measure of the dispersion that
takes all players salaries into account. As the standard deviation of salaries increases, the wage
dispersion on a team increases as well. This measure of dispersion has been used in past studies,
however, it has not been utilized for the time frame that this study is reviewing (Berri, 2004).
The effect of standard deviation on wins and revenue might be different in this study because of
recent changes in the CBA, changes in the number of superstars in the league, and evolution of
contract sizes in the NBA.
The last three measures of dispersion are all related. They are the top player salary as a
percent of total team salary, top two player salaries as a percent of total team salary, and top
three player salaries as a percent of total team salary (from now on referred to as TOP1, TOP2,
and TOP3 respectively). These measures, unlike the first two, do focus on superstars’ salaries
compared to the rest of the team and not just overall distribution of team salary. Obviously, the
higher the percentage of salary paid to top players, the greater the wage dispersion. These
14

measures, have not been applied in published studies to test the effect salary dispersion has on
team wins and revenue. Despite this, they are measures that completely take into account the
salary of superstars and are a good representative measure of a team’s salary dispersion.
C. Other Explanatory Variables
The other explanatory variables are the same in both the wins model and the revenue
model. Despite the fact that this study is attempting to find the “best” amount of salary
dispersion for an NBA team, other variables must be included in this model to control for other
circumstances.
Dispersion Squared is the square of the respective dispersion measure for each regression.
This is used in the empirical model to attempt to see if there is a parabolic curvature to the effect
dispersion has on both wins and revenue. If there is, the maximum point on that curve would
represent the “best” amount of dispersion for wins or revenue respectively. The predicted sign of
this variable is negative, which would create a concave curve and, therefore, a maximum point
representing the “best” possible dispersion level.
The television market size is a variable that controls for the metropolitan size of each
NBA team. This takes into account the number of homes with a television in the metropolitan
area of each NBA teams’ home city. It seems obvious that the size of a team’s market should
have an impact on the amount of revenue generated throughout a season. It is also plausible that
the market size could have an impact on wins as well considering the possibility of there being
more money available from increased revenue for big market teams. There has historically been
very little revenue sharing in the NBA, which makes the possibility of market size having an
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impact on wins even greater (Dosh, 2001). The market size variable is predicted to contain a
positive effect on both team wins and revenue.
The next explanatory variable is a dummy variable that takes into account a team’s salary
position relative to the luxury tax level. The luxury tax level is greater than the salary cap level
and needs to be controlled for in the study. This is because teams can have payrolls that exceed
the salary cap due to certain league exceptions and are not punished for that, but are punished for
exceeding the luxury tax level threshold. As a result of this, most teams have a payroll that does
exceed the salary cap, but only some teams have a payroll that exceeds the luxury tax level. A
luxury tax dummy variable is equal to one if the team has a payroll that is over the luxury tax
threshold. The above luxury tax dummy variable, in this sense, is a proxy for the level of a
team’s payroll and is predicted to be positively correlated with wins and revenue. If teams are
spending enough money to have a payroll that exceeds the luxury tax level, they most likely have
a number of superstars that should create more wins and revenue.
The last variables are fixed effect dummy variables for time. These are included to deal
with possible omitted variable bias. They control for things not already controlled for in the
regression that may be correlated with time. Fixed effect dummy variables are defined for each
year except for 2010-11 which is the reference year for each model. Each of the five seasons has
its own dummy variable associated with it. There is no logical predicted relationship of the time
dummy variables on wins and revenue.
Wins Model: Wins = ß0 + ß1(Dispersion Measure) + ß2 (Dispersion Measure2) + ß3(MRKT) +
ß4(LXTABOVE ) + ß5(FE06-07) + ß6(FE07-08) + ß7(FE08-09) + ß8(FE09-10) + µ
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Revenue Model: Revenue = ß0 + ß1(Dispersion Measure) + ß2 (Dispersion Measure2) +
ß3(MRKT) + ß4(LXTABOVE) + ß5(FE06-07) + ß6(FE07-08) + ß7(FE08-09) + ß8(FE09-10) + µ
V.

Results
The results proceed in four separate subsections. The first subsection describes the

insignificance of the dispersion measure squared variables and provides a justification for
dropping them from the analysis. The second subsection presents the results of the Wins Model
and the affect dispersion has on the number of wins a team achieves, and the third subsection
presents the results of the Revenue Model and the affect dispersion has on the amount of revenue
a team generates. Lastly, the indirect relationship of salary dispersion and revenue through wins
is discussed.
A. Insignificance of Dispersion Measure Squared
After employing every regression in both models, the dispersion measure squared
variable is always found to be insignificant. With the dispersion factor squared variable being
insignificant, it is no longer possible to determine the exact “best” amount of salary dispersion
for an NBA team. This is because the dispersion factor squared variable is responsible for
creating the parabolic shape to the curve and, therefore, a max value of wins or revenue
(depending on which model is being applied) according to dispersion. With dispersion factor
squared being insignificant, the parabolic curve that it creates is insignificant and the point that
represents the “best” amount of dispersion on the curve is not relevant. As a result of this, the
dispersion measure squared variable is removed from each regression tested, which results in a
linear curve instead of a parabolic curve. With a linear curve, a specific optimal level of
dispersion cannot be found, however, the effect dispersion has on wins and revenue is still able
17

to be seen. The effect that is represented by the linear curve will result in the optimal amount of
dispersion to be either zero dispersion or the maximum amount of dispersion possible.
B. Wins Model
Five different regressions are run to determine the effect of salary dispersion on team
wins. Table 2 presents the results of the five OLS regressions. Each regression tests a different
dispersion measure. All of the other explanatory variables besides the dispersion measure
remain constant in each regression of the Wins Model.
Each measure of dispersion tested, the most important variables to this study, reveals that
there is a statistically significant positive relationship between team wage dispersion and the
number of wins. As can be seen in Table 2, four of the five measures of dispersion are
significant at the 1% level. The TOP1 measure is the only dispersion measure to not be
statistically significant at the 5% level, but it is still statistically significant at the 10% level.
Next, a simulation is conducted to assess the magnitude of dispersion in determining wins.
First, the standard deviation of each dispersion measure is calculated (provided in Table 1).
Second, the standard deviation of the dispersion measure is multiplied times the coefficient of
the dispersion measure found in Table 2. In terms of the Gini coefficient dispersion level, a one
standard deviation increase in Gini coefficient will lead to 3.75 more wins during a season.
When using the standard deviation of player salaries as the measure of dispersion, a team will
generate 5.50 more wins when a team increases their total dispersion level by one standard
deviation. These results show that having dispersion not only among superstars and regular
players but across the entire team impacts wins in a positive manner.
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Table 2: Regression Results Predicting Wins
Wins Model
Regression 1

Regression 2

Regression 3

Regression 4

Regression 5

Wins

Wins

Wins

Wins

Wins

45.68
(3.883)***

-

-

-

-

Standard Deviation

-

4.20E-6
(4.988)***

-

-

-

Top Player as % of Total
Team Salary

-

-

39.99
(1.758)*

-

-

Top 2 Players as % of
Total Team Salary

-

-

-

46.16
(3.073)***

-

Top 3 Players as % of
Total Team Salary

-

-

-

-

48.60
(3.992)***

TVMarketSize

-1.52E-6
(-2.935)***

-1.74E-6
(-3.418)***

-1.45E-6
(-2.663)***

-1.63E-6
(-3.033)***

-1.66E-6
(-3.177)***

LuxuryTaxAboveDummy

9.85
(4.574)***

4.73
(1.938)*

11.04
(4.988)***

10.87
(5.019)***

10.32
(4.846)***

Fixed Effect 06-07

.15
(.049)

1.36
(.473)

-.07
(-.024)

.02
(.005)

.31
(.106)

Fixed Effect 07-08

-.56
(-.188)

.30
(.103)

-.92
(-.298)

-.85
(-.281)

-.91
(-.308)

Fixed Effect 08-09

.10
(.034)

-.57
(-.200)

-.16
(-.051)

.01
(.002)

-.11
(-.037)

Fixed Effect 09-10

-3.91
(-1.219)

-2.50
(-.792)

-5.01
(-1.502)

-4.87
(-1.501)

-4.63
(-1.459)

Fixed Effect 10-11

-

-

-

-

-

Adjusted R2

0.215

0.261

0.150

0.186

0.219

F-Value

6.829

8.522

4.760

5.856

6.977

150

150

150

150

150

Dependent Variable
Gini Coefficient

Sample Size

Note: Values in parentheses are absolute t-statistics.
*** = significant at .01 level
** = significant at .05 level
* = significant at .10 level
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The other three dispersion measures (TOP1, TOP2, and TOP3) also show a positive
correlation with wins. The results become more significant and contain a larger effect with every
additional player being included in the percent of total salary. For example, using the TOP1
measure contains a less significant and smaller effect on wins than does the TOP3 measure.
These measures of dispersion only take the dispersion that exists from the highest paid players
on a team compared to everyone else. The results indicate that the greater the salary dispersion of
top paid players in comparison to the lower paid players, the more wins a team will achieve. The
simulations of the effects of a one standard deviation change in the three dispersion measures
(TOP1, TOP2, and TOP3) yield interesting results. A one standard deviation increase in TOP1,
TOP2, and TOP3 is estimated to lead a team to win 1.80, 3.04, and 3.83 more games respectively
in a season.
In all the regressions, the market size control variable is the only variable to have an
opposite effect than what was predicted. This is a result that, at first, appears to have no logic.
After reviewing the data, however, a reason for the size of the market negatively affecting wins
emerges. A number of the big markets in the United States have two NBA teams. Both of these
teams in each respective market technically have the same market size. In reality, however, one
team most likely dominates the popularity within the market. For example, the New York
Knicks and New Jersey Nets share the same New York City metropolitan market. The Knicks,
however, are the much more popular team, while the Nets do not have nearly as many followers.
This means the Nets really have a lower market size than would be reported by ratings systems.
This effect is one possible explanation for the market size negatively affecting the number of
wins achieved by an NBA team.
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Every other control variable behaves according to the presumed logic. All of the fixed
effect variables are statistically insignificant in all of the five regressions.
The market size had a statistically significant negative effect on the number of wins a
team achieves during the regular season for each dispersion level tested. The coefficients of
market size somewhat change depending on the measure of dispersion tested, but not by a great
amount. If the market size of a team increases by one standard deviation, which is 1,822,547
people, a team will win anywhere from 2.64 to 3.17 less games throughout a season depending
on the dispersion measure tested.
The luxury tax variable also contained statistically significant effects on wins for every
measure of dispersion tested. This variable was positively correlated with the number of wins
achieved.

Depending on the measure of dispersion used, a team that has a payroll over the

luxury tax level will obtain anywhere from 4.73 to 11.04 more wins.
These results do not show the specific amount of salary dispersion that is optimal for a
team that has a goal of maximizing wins, however, they do show the linear effects of salary
dispersion on wins. The results indicate that the greater the wage dispersion, the greater the
number of wins achieved.
C. Revenue Regression
Similarly to the Wins Model, five different regressions are run to estimate the effect
salary dispersion within a team has on team revenue. Table 3 presents the results of the five
OLS regressions. Each regression tests a different dispersion measure. All of the other
explanatory variables besides the dispersion measure remain constant in each regression of the
Revenue Model.
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Table 3: Regression Results Predicting Revenue
Revenue Model

Dependent Variable
Gini Coefficient

Regression 1

Regression 2

Regression 3

Regression 4

Regression 5

Revenue

Revenue

Revenue

Revenue

Revenue

26,471,653.47
(.984)

-

-

-

-

Standard Deviation

-

5.11
(2.627)***

-

-

-

Top Player as % of Total
Team Salary

-

-

7,225,121.60
(.144)

-

-

Top 2 Players as % of
Total Team Salary

-

-

-

34,842,116.53
(1.033)

-

Top 3 Players as % of
Total Team Salary

-

-

-

-

37,529,509.59
(1.348)

6.96
(5.863)***

6.54
(5.576)***

7.07
(5.885)***

6.84
(5.675)***

6.81
(5.697)***

29,756,439.65
(6.040)***

22,639,005.64
(4.017)***

30,523,010.42
(6.253)***

30,283,890.81
(6.226)***

29,854,020.91
(6.127)***

Fixed Effect 06-07

-1.08E7
(-1.601)

-9,443,672.39
(-1.421)

-1.08E7
(-1.589)

-1.10E7
(-1.620)

-1.07E7
(-1.591)

Fixed Effect 07-08

-9,330,021.43
(-1.376)

-7,939,754.83
(-1.191)

-9,613,850.40
(-1.414)

-9,452,187.99
(-1.396)

-9,494,599.63
(-1.406)

Fixed Effect 08-09

-7,593,773.59
(-1.120)

-7,874,987.25
(-1.188)

-7,978,633.39
(-1.169)

-7,517,117.55
(-1.108)

-7,592,407.54
(-1.124)

Fixed Effect 09-10

-2.04E7
(-2.777)***

-1.733E7
(-2.384)**

-2.14E7
(-2.907)**

-2.07E7
(-2.849)***

-2.05E7
(-2.830)***

Fixed Effect 10-11

-

-

-

-

-

Adjusted R2

0.345

0.371

0.341

0.345

0.349

F-Value

12.208

13.557

11.993

12.231

12.401

150

150

150

150

150

TVMarketSize

LuxuryTaxAboveDummy

Sample Size

Note: Values in parentheses are absolute t-statistics.
*** = significant at .01 level
** = significant at .05 level
* = significant at .10 level
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In terms of the dispersion measures, there are conflicting results. Every dispersion
measure carries a positive impact on revenue, but four of the five measures of dispersion are not
statistically significant. The standard deviation measure of dispersion, however, shows a
statistically significant relationship. With an increase in one standard deviation of the standard
deviation of player salaries, a team will generate $6,693,302.84 more in revenues. It is
interesting to note that the standard deviation of player salaries dispersion measure takes the
dispersion across the whole team into account and not just the dispersion of superstars to regular
players. The measures of dispersion that take only superstars compared to regular players on a
team into account (TOP1, TOP2, TOP3) show no statistical significance in the effect dispersion
has on revenues.
These results, similarly to the Wins Model, do not show a specific optimal amount of
salary dispersion for a revenue maximizing team, but they do show the effects salary dispersion
has on revenue. The most common result is that salary dispersion does not significantly affect
revenues, but the model that measures dispersion by standard deviation does show that the
greater the amount of dispersion, the greater the revenue generated.
Every control variable behaves according to the presumed logic and contains the
predicted sign. The fixed effect variables were, once again, largely statistically insignificant.
The one difference, however, is that in each regression, the Fixed Effect 09-10 variable was
significant and negative. This shows that something related to time and unaccounted for in this
study caused lower revenues during the 2009-10 season in relation to the 2010-11 NBA season
(the omitted season for control purposes). The market size and luxury tax variables are
extremely significant in every regression and both contain a large positive effect on revenue. In
terms of the market size, depending on the measure of dispersion used, an increase of one
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standard deviation of market size would cause an NBA team to increase their revenue anywhere
from $11,919,459.21 to $12,885,409.27. In terms of the luxury tax variable, a team that has a
payroll over the luxury tax level will generate anywhere from $22,639,005.64 to $30,523,010.42
extra in revenue.
D. Indirect Effect of Dispersion on Revenues Through Wins
The theory and logic behind dispersion affecting revenue seems very strong, but the
results indicate generally insignificant effects. However, there may be an indirect path whereby
dispersion affects revenue. This indirect path has two steps: first, dispersion affecting wins in a
significant way; second, wins affecting revenue in a significant way. If this is the case,
dispersion can influence revenue indirectly through its influence on wins. In every regression of
the Wins Model, dispersion has a significant impact on wins. If number of wins is a significant
variable in affecting revenue, then salary dispersion would have an indirect effect on revenues.
To test this, a regression is carried out to test if number of wins is a significant variable in
determining revenue. The empirical model utilized is the same as the Revenue Model with the
exception of substituting the dispersion measure variable with the number of wins variable. The
results from the regression are provided in Table 4. The result shows that for every extra win a
team achieves, revenues increase by $895,766.82. This result is statistically significant to the 1%
level.
With this result, a point estimate can be deduced to find the indirect effect of dispersion
on revenue through wins. A simulation is conducted to measure the indirect effect. The number
of extra wins a team achieves with an increase of one standard deviation of each respective
dispersion measure multiplied by the $895,766.82 that revenue increases per win would provide
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the point estimate of the indirect relationship of each dispersion measure. Table 5 provides all
the relevant information for calculating the point estimates of the indirect effect of

Table 4 : Regression Results Predicting
Revenue Using Wins
Revenue
Model
Regression 1
Dependent Variable

Revenue

Wins

895,766.82
(5.363)***

TVMarketSize

8.25
(7.502)***

LuxuryTaxAboveDummy

20,494,260.60
(4.247)***

Fixed Effect 06-07

-1.10E7
(-1.779)*

Fixed Effect 07-08

-8,656,316.27
(-1.396)

Fixed Effect 08-09

-7,416,123.33
(-1.198)

Fixed Effect 09-10

-1.62E7
(-2.422)**

Fixed Effect 10-11

-

Adjusted R2

0.452

F-Value

18.526

150
Sample Size
Note: Values in parentheses are absolute tstatistics.
*** = significant at .01 level
** = significant at .05 level
* = significant at .10 level
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salary dispersion on revenue through wins as well as presents the actual point estimates. These
values are only point estimates and a bootstrapping procedure needs to be applied in order to
determine the variance of these results. Krinsky and Robb have demonstrated the bootstrapping
procedure in previous literature and have determined variances from point estimates (Krinsky et
al, 1986). This study, however, does not delve into the bootstrapping process, but the findings
do indicate the possibility of strong indirect effects.
Table 5: Point Estimates of Indirect Effect of Salary Dispersion on Revenue Through Wins
Amount of Revenue
Generated for Each
Extra Win

Number of Extra Wins a Team
Achieves With an Increase in
One Standard Deviation of
Dispersion Measure

Point Estimate of Indirect
Effect of Salary Dispersion
on Revenue Through Wins

Gini Coefficient

$895,766.82

3.75

$3,359,125.58

Standard Deviation

$895,766.82

5.50

$4,926,717.51

Top Player as % of
Total Team Salary

$895,766.82

1.80

$1,612,380.28

Top 2 Players as %
of Total Team Salary

$895,766.82

3.04

$2,723,131.13

Top 3 Players as %
of Total Team Salary

$895,766.82

3.83

$3,430,786.92

Dispersion Measure

VI.

Conclusions
The relatively new phenomenon of large disparities in salary among an NBA team has

allowed a number of studies to be completed to test the effect that salary dispersion has on an
organization. The aim of this study was to determine the “best” amount of salary dispersion for
both a win maximizing NBA team and a revenue maximizing NBA team. Salary dispersion can
be defined in a multitude of different ways. In order to most effectively deal with this issue, five
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different measures of dispersion are used in this study. Two of these measures deal with
dispersion across an entire team while the other three deal with the amount of dispersion between
superstars/team’s highest paid players and the regular skilled players on a team. Using data from
the 2006-07 season to the 2010-11 season, two empirical models were constructed and ten
regressions employed that could help determine the “best” amount of dispersion for both types of
teams.
It is interesting to discover, however, that after these models were tested, a specific “best”
amount of salary dispersion is not able to be determined from the results. Despite this, the effect
salary dispersion has on the number of wins a team achieves and amount of revenue a team
generates is able to be determined.
Based on the results of this study, salary dispersion has a significant positive effect on the
number of wins a team achieves throughout a season for all five definitions of dispersion. This
relationship suggests that the “best” amount of salary dispersion is the maximum amount of
dispersion possible given the salary constraints a team faces.
The results also indicate that salary dispersion contains a statistically insignificant effect
on the amount of revenue a team achieves. Only one of the five measures of dispersion, the
standard deviation of salaries, indicates that wage inequality significantly affects revenues. In
general, there does not seem to be an optimal level of salary dispersion for generating revenue.
After further tests, however, it is found that salary dispersion has a statistically significant
positive indirect effect on revenues through wins.
The results that salary dispersion positively affects the number of wins achieved and that
the direct relationship of dispersion and revenue is insignificant is in contradiction to previous
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literature. A possible reason for this contradiction is that all previous studies have investigated
data from seasons when a different CBA was in effect. Berri and Jewell (2004) performed a
study in an attempt to relate salary dispersion and the number of wins an NBA team achieves.
They found that salary dispersion is not a significant predictor of number of wins. Their
definition of dispersion was based on the standard deviation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,
which is a different definition than employed by this study, which could be another reason for
the difference in results.
Katayama and Nuch (2011) also completed a study attempting to relate the salary
dispersion among an NBA team and the number of wins achieved. They tested three different
dispersion levels (players participating in every game for a given team, players participating in at
least half of the games for a given team, and every player on payroll for a given team) and found
salary dispersion to have no significant effect on the number of wins a team achieves. Once
again, the definition of dispersion differed from Katayama and Nuch’s study to this study.
Hausman and Leonard (1997) found superstars to have a high positive effect on total
team revenue. The study just completed does not necessarily look at superstars specifically and
their effect on revenue, but instead, the effect salary dispersion has on team revenue. Built into a
number of the measures of dispersion, however, is the effect a superstar should carry. The TOP1,
TOP2, and TOP3 salary dispersion measures take into account the dispersion that exists between
the superstars of a team and the regular players. Teams with more superstars will have a higher
percentage of money given to their top players and, therefore, if superstars did affect revenues
positively, the dispersion measures would have a significant positive effect on revenue. The fact
that these dispersion measures do not have a significant effect on team revenue alludes to the
idea that superstars do not have a significant effect on revenues, which is in complete
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contradiction to Hausman and Leonard’s study. Hausman and Leonard’s study, however, took
place during the time period of the NBA where there was no maximum salary for players, which
is not the case for the study that was just completed here. According to Rosen and Oi (1981,
2008), part of the reason people are attracted to superstars is the extreme amount of money they
receive. If this is in fact true, it is possible that setting a maximum salary for an individual player
does not allow fans to reach their highest level of intrigue and therefore provide less revenue to
the firm.
Based on the results from this study, an NBA team that wants to maximize wins should
try to employ as much dispersion of wages as possible and try to acquire as many superstars as
possible filling the remaining spots on their roster with low salary players. This seems to show
that there must not be that great of a drop-off in talent level of the lower salaried players in the
league and the middle salaried players. For a win maximizing team, general managers should
get as many high-skilled, and therefore high-paid, players signed to their team as possible and
then complete the roster with low-paid players instead of signing all middle-value players. Those
teams that are most successful at signing superstars will have the most success.
This result can be connected back to the competitive imbalance problem that exists in the
NBA today. The fact that greater salary dispersion leads to greater number of wins suggests one
reason for the competitive imbalance problem. As already noted, teams most successful at
signing superstars will have the most success on the court. With superstars in limited supply and
the NBA instituting a soft salary cap with many exceptions to the rule, certain teams are
presented the opportunity to become more successful in signing superstars. These teams that are
able to do so will dominate the league in terms of number of wins.
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In terms of policy implications of salary dispersion and revenues, the conclusions drawn
from this study are more tentative. With salary dispersion having no direct significant effect on
revenue it is impossible to state what an NBA team should strive to do in terms of salary
dispersion to generate the most revenue. It seems, however, when looking at the indirect effect
of salary dispersion on revenue through wins, more dispersion leads to more revenue. As a result
of this, a revenue maximizing team should try to employ as much wage disparity as possible
given the constraints. This implication is not as strong as the win maximizing team implication
due to the nature of the indirect effect versus the direct effects.
These results might be able to be translated into other fields of business. Based off of
these results, it is possible that in service business environments where team performance is
important, like it is in the NBA, managers may benefit from hiring as many top notch employees
at each respective job and then complete the hiring process with lower salaried workers. This
may lead to increases in performance. This possibility suggests the need for future research that
focuses on the applicability of NBA results on the non-sports sector.
One possible way to further explore this research is to create even more definitions of
salary dispersion and test each one to see if the effect/absence of effect does change depending
on the definition of dispersion. The definitions of dispersion utilized in this study may have a
significant impact on the effect it has on both performance and revenue. In addition to this, the
indirect effect of dispersion on revenue needs to be addressed further. The bootstrapping
procedure needs to be applied to the point estimates in order to understand the variance of the
indirect effect. With a better and more complete understanding of how salary dispersion affects
firm performance and revenue, NBA teams will be able to construct their teams more
appropriately.
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